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Abstract
This paper presents a New Economic Geography model with distor-
tionary taxation and endogenized trade costs. Tax revenues finance a
public good, infrastructure. We show that the introduction of costly pub-
lic investment in infrastructure increases agglomerative tendencies. With
respect to the regions’ sizes, in the periphery, the price-index for manu-
facturing goods decreases, whereas for the core, the price-index is rather
high since the distortionary effect of taxes dominates. ’Free riding’ − or,
in terms of regional policy, externally funded infrastructure investment −
is beneficial for the periphery, which can devote all its tax revenue to local
demand support, generating a positive home market effect and driving the
catch-up process.
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1 Introduction1
According to the European Commission, transport infrastructure improvements
play ”a key role in the efforts to reduce regional and social disparities in the
European Union, and in the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion”
(see Commission of the European Communities, 1999). Hence, the Commission
supports and endorses the development of Trans-European Transport Networks
(TEN-T) also 30 axes of priority, which now also encompass the new Eastern
European member states, for instance a corridor from Tallin via Riga and Warsaw
to Bratislava and Vienna (see Commission of the European Communities, 2005).
Both the European Union as well as national governments will contribute to its
financing. According to the Commission of the European Communities (2005),
total costs are estimated to be around 330 billion Euros in the period from 2007-
2013, where more than half of these costs need to be covered by the member
states and other non-EU-related sources. Those TEN-T’s are a key element in
the revised ’Lisbon strategy for competitiveness and employment in Europe’,
since the EU considers good transport infrastructure, and good accessibility for
and of all its members as a key element for economic development in Europe.
The economic literature seems to support this view. According to Limao and
Venables (1999), the elasticity of trade volumes with respect to transport costs
is estimated at around −2.5, i.e., halving transport costs increases the volume
of trade by a factor of five. This belief is also shared outside the EU: Fan and
Zhang (2004) in a study on Chinese rural regions confirm that infrastructure is a
key to rural development, particularly in all non-agricultural sectors. Henderson
et al. (2001) point into a similar direction for African countries and regions.
1First of all, we would like to thank Antonio Accetturo, Marius Bru¨lhart, Simon Loretz, Jim
Markusen, Giordano Mion, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Michael Pfaffermayr, and participants at the
2006 ETSG Meetings in Vienna as well as at the 2007 Workshop on Economic Geography at
the Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis for valuable comments and discussions. Of course,
all the remaining errors are ours.
Both authors gratefully acknowledge financial support within the TERA project funded by the
European Commission in the 6th Framework Programme of RTD (grant no. FP6-SSP-2005-
006469). This publication does not necessarily reflect the European Commission’s views and
in no ways anticipates the Commission’s future policy in this area.
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In this paper, we look at the users of infrastructure, firms and consumers, and
we explore the links between infrastructure and its (public) financing through
taxes. The vehicle being employed in this paper is a simple New Economic
Geography (henceforth: NEG) model following Krugman (1991a,b) and Fujita et
al. (1999) with endogenized transport costs, where we focus on, (i) infrastructure,
(ii) regional governments and taxation, and (iii) regional policy. According to
Puga (2002), those models are suitable for this type of analysis, since they focus
on the relations between transport costs, agglomeration, and regional disparities,
which makes them especially useful for studying to study the role of (transport)
infrastructure.
A better modelling of infrastructure and transport costs has received a consider-
able degree of attention in the literature.
Earlier formulations of infrastructure modelling in one-region frameworks Arrow
and Kurtz (1970) and Barro (1990) include it in the production function, as some
sort of general public expenditure; however, these contributions can obviously not
grasp the effects of public intervention on trade dynamics. In two-regions settings,
Andersson and Forslid (2003) build a NEG-model where tax revenue is used to
finance a public good entering the utility function, rather than the production
function, and analyze how tax increases affect the distribution of workers across
regions. Egger and Falkinger (2006) show that national public infrastructure
investments have positive effects on the number of intermediate goods producers
and the return of the immobile factor in the home country, whereas international
outsourcing declines. Opposite effects occur for the other country in this model.
On the other hand, efforts to overcome the pure exogeneity of transport costs
include few relevant contributions. Mori and Nishikimi (2002) establish a link
with economies of density, which are supposed to be external to each firm. In their
formulation, transport costs are constant up to a given threshold of aggregate
trade; then, density economies come into action, and transport costs are a non-
linear decreasing function of them (defined by aggregate volume of trade). A
somewhat similar characterization is provided by Behrens and Gaigne´ (2006),
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who distinguish between fixed unit transport costs (determined by technology
and infrastructure) and unit shipping costs, which vary with the total volume of
trade and, therefore, with the spatial distribution of supply and demand1.
However, all these contributions do not look at the fundamental link we want
to focus on, namely the direct link between public intervention and transport
costs. The most relevant work in this respect has been carried out by Martin
and Rogers (1995). In their model, transport costs are a decreasing function
of publicly provided infrastructure, which can be distinguished between being
domestic or international. Their results show that trade integration will lead
firms to locate in the region with better domestic infrastructure. Differences
in international infrastructure alone do not determine the allocation of industrial
activities, but rather increase the sensitivity of the industrial patterns to domestic
infrastructure differentials. Martin and Rogers (1995) also analyze the welfare
consequences of increasing infrastructure provision through lump-sum taxation,
reaching opposite conclusions on agglomeration equilibria according to the type
of infrastructure being built (domestic or international).
Our contribution is inspired by this latter paper (Martin and Rogers, 1995).
The endogenization of transport costs comes in two steps. First, introducing a
corporate sales tax that generates revenue for the corresponding region. Local
governments allocate these tax revenues between infrastructure investments and
lump-sum transfers to support their consumers’ incomes. Second, the infras-
tructure is being built using the same production technology employed in the
manufacturing sector. The quantity of infrastructure provided is weighted by a
scaling and efficiency parameter, which determines the exact reduction of trans-
port costs which affects firms’ decisions on location and trade. Unlike Martin
and Rogers (1995), we assume that infrastructure is only international (i.e. it
applies to inter-regional trade only), but it is financed by distortionary taxation
on firms’ sales and can only be supplied by the public authority. This last as-
1Other recent approaches of dealing with endogenized transport or trade costs in NEG-
models include for instance Mansori (2003), Behrens et al. (2006), or Duranton and Storper
(2008).
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sumption allows us to ignore possible crowding-out effects on the private sector.
Our results show that public infrastructure investments lead to more pronounced
agglomeration patterns, i.e. the concentration of industries is fostered, which
confirms previous results obtained in different settings by Andersson and Forslid
(2003) and Baldwin et al. (2003). This would suggest that only central regions
may benefit from public policy measures related to infrastructure.
Nonetheless, this is also beneficial for the region ending up as the periphery,
since also in this region the price index for manufactured goods decreases, which
is due to cheaper imported product varieties. The reduction of transport costs
is very effective for high initial values of trade costs (i.e. before infrastructure
investments), while there are less absolute effects when transport costs are already
low. In terms of regional policy, it can be shown that it might be useful if
such infrastructure investments are only financed by the central region (i.e., the
periphery receiving for instance structural funds benefits by the EU, or - in terms
of our model - being a free rider in infrastructure provision), since both regions
benefit from such investments, while the periphery can spend its locally collected
taxes for local purposes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model, while Section 4 investigates the core-periphery patterns, as well as the
effects of the infrastructure provided on trade costs and firms. Section 5 looks at
the sensitivity of the model and provides additional insights regarding the major
policy parameters. The last Section summarizes and concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
There are two regions indexed as {i, j} = {1, 2}. Both regions produce two trad-
able goods, X and Z. Z is a homogenous agricultural good produced at constant
returns to scale by a competitive industry. X-goods (manufacturing goods) are
horizontally differentiated in the usual Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) manner. Firms
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may sell on the local market and export to the other region, where the number
of firms from region i is denoted by ni.
Quantities of Z and X are indexed as follows. The first subscript denotes the
region where the headquarters and the production are based, the second subscript
indicates the region where the good is sold. Therefore, Xij are the exports of
region i-based firms to region j2. Xic denotes the consumption of X in region
i, being a CES aggregate of the individual varieties. We assume the consumer’s
preferences to be a nest of the homogeneous Z-good and the differentiated X-
good. The utility of region i (Ui) can thus be formulated as follows:
Ui = X
µ
ic (Zii + Zji)
1−µ ,
Xic ≡
[
ni (Xii)
σ−1
σ + nj
(
Xji
1 + τ
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, (1)
where µ denotes the (constant) Cobb-Douglas expenditure share for differentiated
products, and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
We assume that Z-goods are costlessly tradable across regions, whereas X-goods
trade incurs iceberg transport costs (τ), which are symmetric for either direction
of shipment. In terms of quantity, one unit of consumption of an X-variety in
region j requires a firm in i to send (1 + τ) units. For convenience, quantities
of X are defined as firm-specific productions for the respective foreign market.
However, as in our model transport costs may vary with government expendi-
tures and thus the amount of infrastructure being provided (as outlined below),
transport or trade costs are endogenous to this model.
As usual, the consumer’s maximization problem can be solved in two steps. In the
first step, each variety Xji needs to be chosen such that it minimizes the cost of
attaining Xic, whatever the consumption of Xic is. In the second step, consumers
allocate income between the Z-good, and the composite X-good. Let pji be the
price of an X-variety in region i produced by a firm in region j. The price for
the homogenous agricultural good, qi, is indexed once, since all (indigenous and
foreign) homogenous goods consumed at a single location i must face the same
2Whenever we use i and j from the set {1, 2}, this implies that i 6= j.
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price qi. We take q1 as the nume´raire. Further, Pi denotes the price aggregator,
defined as the minimum cost of buying one unit of Xi at prices pji of an individual
variety:
Pi = min
Xji
∑
i,j
pjiXji s.t. Xi = 1. (2)
The first-stage budgeting problem leads to:
Xji = (pji)
−σP σ−1i µYi ∀ i, j ∈ {1, 2}, (3)
where Yi denotes total expenditures of consumers in region i, and pji = pj (1 + τ),
i.e., the local goods price in region j (pj) including transport costs (1+τ). Identi-
cal price elasticities of demand and identical marginal costs (technologies) within
a region ensure that the price of a locally produced manufacturing good is equal
to the mill price for exports. Hence, prices of all manufacturing goods produced
in one region are equal in equilibrium. pi denotes the price of all goods produced
in region i. With these assumptions, the price aggregator Pi of differentiated
goods consumed in region i can be written as
Pi =
[
nip
1−σ
i + nj ((1 + τ)pj)
1−σ] 11−σ . (4)
Note that due to the adopted assumptions about technology, factor markets, and
demand − in equilibrium − the delivered prices of indigenous (pii) and imported
variants (pji, i.e., mill price including transport costs) of the manufacturing good
are the same in region i. The second-stage budgeting yields the division of ex-
penditures between the two sectors:
Xic =
µ
Pi
Yi, (5)
Zii + Zji =
1− µ
qi
Yi (6)
2.2 Taxation, Infrastructure, and Transport Costs
In our model we aim at endogenizing transport cost by tax-financed and publicly
provided infrastructure.
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Taxes (taxi) are introduced as a distortionary sales tax. The profit function of
firms therefore becomes slightly enlarged:
Πi = pi (Xi) (1− taxi)− cXi (Xi)− FCni, (7)
where Πi are the profits of a region i firm, Xi is the firm’s output and comprises
of locally sold as well as exported goods (Xii + Xij), cXi are the variable unit
costs, and FCni are the fixed costs of production. We will return to the details
of the cost structure in the next subsection.
The distortionary effect of this tax can be seen in the resulting pricing equation,
which is derived by profit maximization and employing the Amoroso-Robinson-
relation.
pi = cXi
σ
σ − 1
1
1− taxi , (8)
Hence, the total tax revenues, and subsequently total government spending in a
region, Gi, is
Gi = taxipini (Xii +Xij) . (9)
Out of these tax revenues, a fraction 0 < κi < 1 is devoted to infrastructure
building, and the remaining fraction 1 − κi is used for lump-sum transfers to
region i’s population, supporting their incomes.
For simplicity, we assume that the production technology for infrastructure is the
same as for manufacturing goods, without being subject to economies of scale.
Thus, the amount of infrastructure (Ii) being provided by region i’s government
is
Ii =
κiGi
aLxiwLi + aTxiwTi
. (10)
We assume that both regions’ infrastructure contributes to the reduction of trans-
port costs for shipments between the two regions. Hence, the resulting endoge-
nously determined value for transport costs is determined by
τ =
t
(Ii + Ij + 1)
β
, (11)
where t is an ’initial value’ for transport costs, which also corresponds to a ’no-tax
scenario’ without taxes and infrastructure, i.e. to the standard NEG-model with
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exogenously given transport costs. It may also be regarded as general impedi-
ments to trade between the two regions, or as the amount of trade costs before
any policy interventions (i.e., public infrastructure investments in this model)
take place. 0 < β < 1 is a scaling parameter which reflects the ’effectiveness’ of
the infrastructure provided. Furthermore, note that both regions’ infrastructure
investments simultaneously affect the actual reduction of trade costs (τ)3.
2.3 Factor Markets, Production and Income
Let wLi and wTi denote the nominal factor rewards of labor and land in region i,
respectively. There is perfect competition in the Z-sector, and each firm produces
under constant returns to scale using a CES production technology, employing
labor (L) and land (T ) (where ’b’ is the coefficient for T and ’1− b’ for L), with
an elasticity of substitution of 1/(1 − ρz) and (−∞ < ρz < 1). As all firms
face the same factor prices and the CES technology is homothetic and exhibits
constant returns to scale, [(1− b)Lρzi + bT ρzi ]
1
ρz , all firms in a region face the
same unit input coefficients. The region-specific unit input coefficients for the
two factors of Z-production can be derived by cost minimization subject to this
CES technology:
aLzi =
(
wLi
1− b
) 1
ρz−1
[(
wρzTi
b
) 1
ρz−1
+
(
wρzLi
1− b
) 1
ρz−1
]− 1
ρz
(12)
aTzi =
(wTi
b
) 1
ρz−1
[(
wρzTi
b
) 1
ρz−1
+
(
wρzLi
1− b
) 1
ρz−1
]− 1
ρz
, (13)
Variable unit costs (i.e., marginal costs) cZi satisfy
cZi ≥ aLziwLi + aTziwT i ⊥ Zii ≥ 0, (14)
where ⊥ indicates that at least one of the adjacent conditions has to hold with
equality. This implies
cZi ≥ qj ⊥ Zij ≥ 0. (15)
3In order to avoid mathematical problems if for some reason both regions’ infrastructure
investments are equal to zero, we add 1 in the denominator, w.l.o.g.
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There is monopolistic competition in the X-sector, and again each firm produces
under a CES production technology, using labor (L) and land (T ) (where ’a’ is the
coefficient for L and ’1−a’ for T ), with an elasticity of substitution of 1/(1−ρx)
and (−∞ < ρx < 1). As all firms face the same factor prices and the CES technol-
ogy is homothetic and exhibits constant returns to scale, [aLρxi + (1− a)T ρxi ]
1
ρx ,
all firms in a region face the same unit input coefficients. The region specific
unit input coefficients for the two factors of X-production can be derived by cost
minimization subject to this CES technology:
aLxi =
(wLi
a
) 1
ρx−1
[(
wρxLi
a
) 1
ρx−1
+
(
wρxTi
1− a
) 1
ρx−1
]− 1
ρx
(16)
aTxi =
(
wTi
1− a
) 1
ρx−1
[(
wρxLi
a
) 1
ρx−1
+
(
wρxTi
1− a
) 1
ρx−1
]− 1
ρx
(17)
Additionally, X-sector firms require labor (aLni) and land to set up plants (aTni),
leading to increasing returns to scale in production.
Factor market clearing in region i for labor (Li) and land (Ti) requires
Li ≥ aLxini (Xii +Xij) + aLnini + aLxiIi +
aLziwLi (Zii + Zij) ⊥ wLi ≥ 0, (18)
Ti ≥ aTxini (Xii +Xij) + aTnini + aTxiIi +
aTziwTi (Zii + Zij) ⊥ wTi ≥ 0. (19)
Variable unit costs of producing an X-variety in region i are given by cXi =
aLxiwLi + aTxiwTi. There is a fixed markup over variable costs, which is de-
termined by the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Given that under
CES-utility demand for all varieties is positive, the price setting behavior by
firms is given by equation 8. Free entry and exit implies that firms earn zero
profits, since operating profits are used to cover fixed costs. The corresponding
zero profit condition determines the numbers of firms.
Manufacturing firms in i have to bear fixed costs of FCni = aLiwLi + aTniwTi.
The zero profit condition, therefore, implies
FCni ≥ pi (Xii +Xij)
σ
(1− taxi) ⊥ ni ≥ 0. (20)
9
All factors are owned by the households, so that consumer income (i.e., GNP) in
region i is given by
Yi = wLiLi + wTiTi + (1− κi)Gi, (21)
The equivalence of total factor income (Yi, Yj) and demand in each region im-
plicitly balances payments between regions.
Real factor rewards (ω) are normalized by region-specific costs of living,
P−µi q
µ−1
i , and are thus given by:
ωki = wkiP
−µ
i q
µ−1
i , k ∈ {L, T} . (22)
3 Core-Periphery Patterns
The analysis of the model is conducted along several lines of investigation. First,
the standard agglomeration structure will be evaluated, which means for this
model, that the ’initial value’ of transport costs, i.e. the value of t that would
apply for a scenario without taxes, varies from 1% to 99% of the price of X-goods.
Since publicly provided and tax-financed infrastructure might be viewed as quite
many different things, and not merely − for instance − better roads reducing
travel times, we suggest to interpret the endogenous transport costs (τ) of the
present model more generally as trade costs. This is especially important in our
model, since regional public authorities usually do not have the opportunity to
influence ’pure’ transport costs, but they rather can try to generally improve their
region’s competitive position.
Second, we look at variations of the policy parameters which are of our primary
interest, the tax rate (tax), and the fraction of government expenditures devoted
to infrastructure building (κ). This is also useful to analyze the model’s sensitivity
to parameter changes. Thus, the main focus of the following analysis is put on
investigating how the parameters which may be influenced by policy makers shape
the economic landscape.
In contrast to the standard NEG-model a` la Krugman (1991b), production of
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the manufacturing good uses two input factors (L and T ). In those models it
is straightforward to assume that the factor used in the manufacturing sector is
mobile across regions. In line with the literature, all factors are immobile in the
short run. In the long run, we investigate situations where L is mobile across
regions4.
Figure 1 represents the standard NEG-model, i.e., a scenario without taxation,
while Figure 2 is the reference scenario for all the subsequent alterations of our
model, i.e. the standard NEG-model plus taxation. As it can be seen from
Figures 1 and 2, the equilibrium locations of industries show the well known
bifurcation diagrams, the Tomahawk-bifurcation in the terminology of Fujita et
al. (1999).
Moving from the right to the left in our diagrams (Figures 1 and 2), i.e., moving
from higher to lower (initial values of) trade costs, we observe one long-run stable
symmetric equilibrium until t ≈ 0.38 in the scenario without taxation (see Figure
1), and t ≈ 0.47 in the scenario with taxation (see Figure 2) − the break points
(following Fujita et al., 1999). At lower trade costs, we find three interior equi-
libria, two stable ones and an unstable one. There are two symmetric long-run
stable equilibria between 0.76 ' λLi ' 0.71 and 0.29 ' λLi ' 0.24, respectively.
These two partially agglomerated equilibria, denoted by solid lines in the dia-
grams, turn out to be stable from t ≈ 0.39 in the scenario without taxation (see
Figure 1), and from t ≈ 0.49 in the scenario with taxation (see Figure 2) − again,
moving from the right to the left. Those two points correspond to the sustain
points, again following Fujita et al. (1999). Also at low trade costs, there is one
unstable symmetric equilibrium, indicated by a dotted line, from t ≈ 0.38, in the
no-tax scenario, and from t ≈ 0.47 in the taxation scenario. Now, we turn to
analyzing the agglomeration patterns.
4We have chosen the following parameter values for all of the following simulations: σ = 4,
µ = 0.35, β = 0.1, a = b = 0.8, ρx = ρz = −0.5, L = L1+L2 = 60, T = T1+ T2 = 100, t = 0.7,
tax1 = tax2 = 0.2, κ1 = κ2 = 1 if nothing else is mentioned.
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3.1 Effects of Taxation on the Agglomeration Patterns
In Figure 1 we show the no-tax and no-infrastructure bifurcation diagram. This
is obtained by setting both the tax rates and, consequently, the infrastructure
expenditures equal to zero, and varying the initial impediments to trade (t) be-
tween 1% and 99% of the price of manufacturing goods. The results show that
the main qualitative results from Krugman (1991b) can be replicated, i.e., there
is agglomeration at low trade costs, and dispersion at higher trade costs. Due to
our production technology assumptions (CES production function in both sec-
tors, and flexible input coefficients) there is no full-agglomeration equilibrium.
However, there is still partial agglomeration at lower initial values of trade costs,
and a symmetric equilibrium at higher values of t.
Then, in Figure 2, we activate taxes and infrastructure spending by setting the
tax rates in both regions to taxi = 0.2 and κi = 1
5. The endogenization of
trade costs through public infrastructure investments in this framework leads
the partially agglomerated equilibrium to be sustainable for a larger range of
trade costs. The infrastructure provided by the regions’ governments allows the
agglomerated equilibrium to remain stable for higher initial (i.e., no-tax) values
of trade costs. This result confirms Baldwin et al. (2003, chapter 17), who
find that infrastructure, facilitating interregional trade, leads to increased spatial
concentration. They also note that this subsequently leads to higher growth in
the whole economy (i.e., also in the periphery), and to a decrease in nominal
income inequalities between the center and the periphery.
5Figure 2 constitutes the benchmark case for all the subsequent analyses and comparisons.
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Figure 1: Standard bifurcation diagram without taxation and infrastructure, and
λT = 0.5.
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Figure 2: Bifurcation diagram with taxation and infrastructure, and λT = 0.5.
Benchmark scenario.
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Lower trade costs due to public infrastructure investments also influence regional
disparities. The price index of manufacturing goods decreases as trade costs
diminish. This effect is the net result of two opposing forces, (i) lower trade costs
leading to lower costs for imported goods, hence constituting a positive price
index effect, and (ii) more goods need to be imported since some firms might
have an incentive to relocate to the center, which in turn means that more goods
have to be imported in total, resulting in a negative price index effect.
Figure 3 compares the price index-differences for manufacturing goods in the
benchmark case (Figure 2) to the no-tax (and hence no-infrastructure) scenario
(Figure 1. It turns out that the differences in the price index-differential is high
at high trade costs, and approach zero as trade costs diminish. As a result, public
infrastructure provision by regional authorities is beneficial for the center as well
as the periphery, since the prices for manufacturing goods also decrease in the
periphery despite hosting less firms as trade costs diminish (for the latter, see also
Figure 7, left panel). Looking at Figure 3, it can be seen that at low values of t,
the are almost no differences in the price indices between the small (peripheral)
and the large (central) region. At higher t’s, the smaller region’s price index
decreases compared to the no-infrastructure setting, since infrastructure reduces
transport costs, and hence the price of imported goods. The larger region does
not enjoy these benefits since it hosts already the major share of firms. This
result confirms Kilkenny (1998) who finds that a reduction of transport costs in
rural areas leads to an improvement in rural development.
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Figure 3: Difference in the price-index ratio for manufacturing goods between
the scenarios of Figures 2 and 1.
Figure 4 looks at the amount of tax revenues collected by regional governments,
which are then transformed into government spending. We find a Laffer-curve
shape as the size of a region varies. Tax revenues are maximized when a region
hosts approximately 75% of the workers, depending on the value of t (see Figure
4). Note that this corresponds to the long-run stable equilibrium for the larger
region in Figure 2, and thus to the size in terms of labor endowment (λLi) of the
larger region in the partially agglomerated equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Tax revenues corresponding to the benchmark scenario of Figure 2.
Changes in the exogenously given tax rate (tax) cause the agglomeration equi-
librium to be sustainable for a larger range of values of t than in the benchmark
case, unless the tax rate does not become too high. Quite similar effects are
observable by altering the fraction of government expenditures devoted to in-
frastructure provision (κ). The higher κ, the more sustainable agglomeration
becomes due to the fact that more (or better) infrastructure will be provided.
But also a κi = κj = 0 does not lead to a symmetric agglomeration equilibrium
only. Of course, in this case no infrastructure can be provided to reduce trade
costs, but at lower initial values of t a core-periphery structure emerges in this
case, too.
3.2 Free Riding - Policy Intervention
Now, we turn to a particular choice of κ, the fraction of government spending
devoted to infrastructure investments. We let one region ’free ride’ in infrastruc-
ture provision, i.e., we let κi = 0. It is important to note that in our model,
free riding may not be understood in the ’classical’ economic sense, since we do
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not have any form of tax competition in our setting. The issue of free riding
rather is a policy-relevant scenario. The basic idea behind this scenario is in-
spired by the EU’s efforts to develop peripheral regions via the structural funds
measures, such as Objective 1 or 2, but also the Interreg programs. All these
programs have in common the attempt to help peripheral regions to foster their
economic development. The idea is to devote external sources of funding (such
as EU structural funds) to infrastructure building, in order to allow those regions
to utilize their own budgetary resources for other purposes − i.e., in our model,
lump-sum transfers which strengthen the income base of regions. In this sense,
we use the expression ”free-riding”: a situation where the region benefits from
the reduction in transports costs, resulting from external infrastructure spending,
without having to pay for it in terms of increased tax pressure.
If one region free rides in infrastructure provision, or has some external source
of funding, i.e. κi = 0 while κj > 0, a somewhat different picture develops (see
Figure 5), compared to what we have obtained in our baseline scenario of Figure 2.
In this situation, there is again partial agglomeration at low trade costs. However,
the smaller region’s equilibrium breaks as the initial trade costs approach about
t = 0.5, while the (at low t’s) larger region’s equilibrium agglomeration path
remains sustainable over the whole range of trade costs.
Note that as the smaller region’s equilibrium breaks, the larger region’s agglomer-
ation becomes significantly less pronounced. This equilibrium becomes the only
one at higher trade costs, and decreases even slightly below λLi = 0.5. This
means that at higher initial trade costs, there emerges a picture which is similar
to the original core-periphery pattern, but slightly asymmetric. However, the
asymmetry is not as pronounced as one might have expected it. The free riding
region is almost of equal size as the other one (λLi ≈ 0.48). This is due to the fact
that there is no interregional tax competition in the present setup6, and that the
region which free rides in infrastructure provision transfers its entire tax revenues
6Again, note that it is not the intention or purpose of this paper to investigate the con-
sequences of tax competition, but to look at regional development and policy, also from the
peripheral region’s perspective.
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lump-sum to its population generating additional income and hence additional
demand. Therefore, there are always some firms having incentives to locate in
the free-riding region, due to the classical home-market effect.
Looking at this result from a social planner’s perspective, we find that free rid-
ing for a small or peripheral region is beneficial. A region in need of a better
connection to the ”center”, therefore, should not contribute to public infrastruc-
ture investments if initially the trade costs are high (i.e., before implementing
any policy measures). This is due to the fact that the free riding region keeps
their tax revenues within the region and generates additional income through
the lump-sum redistribution of the tax revenues among its population. A better
infrastructure, although financed by a different region, develops the connections
between those regions such that it becomes possible, also for the more remotely
located region, to attract additional firms. Note, that instead of tax competi-
tion, the role of competition in this model is played by the independent decision
of each regional government to set its κ, i.e. to divide its government expendi-
tures between infrastructure investment and lump-sum transfers to its respective
population.
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Figure 5: Bifurcation diagram with region i free riding in infrastructure provision,
and λT = 0.5.
3.3 Asymmetric Taxation and Size of the Regions
Asymmetric taxation between the two regions exclusively leads to agglomeration
in the region with the lower tax rate (region j in this case). This is quite an
intuitive result since the region with a lower tax rate attracts more firms which
in turn attract more workers (see Figure 6). Note that region i always remains
small in this scenario (it is the only stable equilibrium), while region j is rather
large.
A similar result, though through a different channel, occurs when the endowment
with land (T ) differs across region. In this case, there is agglomeration in the
region endowed with more land. This is due to the fact that both goods, X and
Z, require some T in production and X-sector firms also need land as a fixed
input for setting up their production plant. Only at very low initial trade costs,
agglomeration in the smaller region (in terms of T ) may be a long run stable
equilibrium.
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Figure 6: Bifurcation diagram with taxi = 0.5, and λT = 0.5.
Varying the scaling and efficiency parameter β shows that a higher β leads (i)
to a more significant reduction in trade costs (τ) which in turn makes (ii) the
partially agglomerated equilibrium more sustainable, also at higher initial values
of trade costs (t).
Looking at region i’s share of firms and at the infrastructure provided in region
i, we note several things. First, if region i has less than about 20% of the world’s
endowment with labor (see the λLi-axis in Figures 7 and 8, left panel in each
case), there are no firms headquartered in region i (Figure 7), and thus there
is also no infrastructure being provided by region i (Figure 8). The two right
hand panels of these two figures show the same analyses for asymmetric taxation
(taxi = 0.5, while taxj remains at its original value of 0.2). Figure 7 shows
that due to the higher tax rate in region i, the area without any firms in region
i increases by about 50%, and hence also the area where region i is not able
to provide public infrastructure7. From Figure 6 we know that the only stable
7Note that in those cases where the share of firms in region i is zero and no infrastructure
is being provided, also the tax revenues and hence government expenditures are zero.
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equilibrium configuration for workers emerges when region i hosts about 25%
of the workers (in region j there are the remaining about 75%). Hence, in this
asymmetric taxation-scenario, only the region with lower taxes (i.e., region j)
will host firms (for all values of t or τ). Thus, region i needs to import all of its
manufacturing goods from region j. This constitutes the same result as a full-
agglomeration equilibrium of a standard model, despite region i hosting some
of the workers in our scenario. The tax-rate-differential (of 30%) between both
regions outweighs the rather large share of workers in region i. Looking at the
right panel of Figure 7, if region i was very large (i.e., at a large λLi), firms would
have an incentive to relocate to j because of the lower tax rate there, until the
stable equilibrium is reached.
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Figure 7: Share of firms in region i (left panel, benchmark case) and with taxi =
0.5 and taxj = 0.2 (right panel).
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Figure 8: Infrastructure provided in region i (left panel, benchmark case) and
with taxi = 0.5 and taxj = 0.2 (right panel).
3.4 Endogenous Trade Costs
Turning to the endogenized trade costs (τ), and investigating the influence of
public infrastructure provision on the reduction of trade costs, we generally find
the following. The higher the initial trade costs are, the larger the absolute effect
of infrastructure, and thus the larger the reduction of trade costs will be. Hence,
the absolute decrease of trade costs caused by infrastructure investments is higher
if the initial impediments to trade are high. This decrease would be even stronger
if the scaling and efficiency parameter β was higher, also at higher tax rates. In
other words, for regions being rather remote from economic centers and having
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high interregional impediments to trade, it makes more sense to strengthen the
infrastructure network than for quite integrated or centrally located regions where
trade costs are already quite low.
Some of the above findings can easily be seen by inspecting the equations on
infrastructure provision, equations 9, 10, and 11. Plugging equation 9 into 10,
we obtain
Ii =
κitaxipini (Xii +Xij)
aLxiwLi + aTxiwTi
, (23)
and plugging the resulting equation 23 into 11 we have
τ =
t[
κitaxipini(Xii+Xij)
aLxiwLi+aTxiwTi
+
κjtaxjpjnj(Xjj+Xji)
aLxjwLj+aTxjwTj
+ 1
]β , (24)
Inspecting equation 23, public infrastructure investments are generally facilitated
(i) by higher taxes since there is more money to be spent (of course we have to
bear in mind that tax revenues might decrease as the tax rate increases − as
shown in Figure 4 for values of λLi ' 0.75), (ii) by a larger number of firms
and (iii) by higher quantities being produced in a region (more firms producing
higher quantities pay more taxes). Consequently, this leads to larger reductions
of trade costs (see equation 24). Additionally, a higher efficiency or better quality
of the infrastructure provided (i.e., a higher β), also leads to a stronger reduction
of trade costs. Similarly, some external funding via transfer payments (where
’external’ means external to regional budgets, which we have not included in our
model) facilitates and increases regional public infrastructure provision. Clearly,
infrastructure becomes more expensive, and thus its provision decreases, as the
factor prices and/or the factor input requirements rise.
4 Sensitivity Analysis
Moderate variations of the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the dif-
ferentiated manufacturing good, σ, and the technical rate of substitution between
input factors, ρ, show that the model’s reactions are very stable. In terms of the
bifurcation loci, this means that they are either stretched or compressed (i.e.,
23
more or less pronounced agglomeration equilibria) or shifted to the left or to the
right (i.e., more or less sustainable agglomeration or dispersion equilibria) as it
has to be expected qualitatively by the respective parameter change. The same
applies for the income expenditure share for manufactures, µ, where a higher
(lower) µ leads to stronger (weaker) agglomeration in equilibrium.
Apart from varying these modelling parameters, we also simulate variations of
the two policy parameters tax and κ. We refer to these two parameters as ’policy
parameters’, since these two values may be chosen by the regional decision makers.
Additionally, various t’s for these two scenarios are being tested. Varying the tax
rate (tax) and the fraction of government expenditures devoted to infrastructure
building (κ) shows no effect as the initial trade costs are high (t = 0.7). We have
first chosen a rather high value of t for this analysis, in order to be able to reflect
the situation that may occur between centrally and peripherally located regions.
As all the bifurcation diagrams show, there is always only a stable symmetric
equilibrium at these values of t. At t = 0.2, the opposite picture develops. Here,
agglomeration is a sustainable equilibrium for all values of both tax and κ, since
trade costs are simply low enough to render agglomeration sustainable, no matter
how the other parameters are configured. Hence, variations of tax and κ only
affect more integrated economies with lower trade costs.
As the fraction of government expenditures devoted to infrastructure investments,
κ, varies from 0 to 1, interesting insights may be gained as far as the development
of trade costs (τ) is concerned. The equal division of the government expenditures
between infrastructure investments and transfers to the population (i.e. κ =
0.5) leads to a reduction of trade costs by about 9% of the goods’ price. An
additional increase of κ up to κ = 1 reduces trade costs only by a further 3%.
Thus, a region’s government needs to account for this decreasing effectiveness
of infrastructure investments when deciding on its policy measures. A higher
efficiency of infrastructure provision (β) increases the reduction of trade costs,
while the decreasing effectiveness of infrastructure investments remains evident.
Variations of the tax rate do not show any significant changes in the core-
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periphery patterns as long as they are coordinated in both regions. Also, the
development of tax revenues and infrastructure provision is unaffected by coordi-
nated changes in the tax rate. However, the effects on trade costs are noteworthy.
No matter what the tax rate is, trade costs are lowest when workers (and indus-
tries) are concentrated in either of the regions (this corresponds to the partially
agglomerated equilibria of Figure 2, whereas they tend to be somewhat higher
when the regions are of equal size.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we look at tax-financed public infrastructure investment and its
impact on the development of regional core-periphery patterns. Associated issues
are the impact of potential regional policy measures on (i) the financing-structure
of those infrastructure investments, (ii) the core-periphery structure in terms of
the distribution of the population and firms, and (iii) subsequently also on the
income-base of the regions.
The vehicle we employ in this paper is a simple New Economic Geography model
with endogenized transport (trade) costs. The endogenization of trade costs
comes in two steps. First, introducing a corporate sales tax generates revenues
for the regions. Regional governments allocate these tax revenues between in-
frastructure investments and a lump-sum transfer to their respective region’s
population. Second, the infrastructure is being built using the same production
technology as for the manufactured good. The quantity of infrastructure pro-
vided is weighted by a scaling and efficiency parameter determines the amount
by which the transport costs are being reduced. These reduced transport costs
enter into the model influencing the firms’ decisions on location and trade.
Our results may be summarized as follows. First, confirming the previous results
by Andersson and Forslid (2003) or Baldwin et al. (2003), although in different
settings, we show that the introduction of costly public investment in infras-
tructure leads to more pronounced agglomeration: the core-periphery pattern
becomes more sustainable for a wider range of (initial) trade costs. Increasing
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either the tax rate or the fraction of public revenues devoted to infrastructure
renders the agglomeration equilibrium even more sustainable, unless the tax rate
does not become too high.
Second, the effects on prices are the following. With respect to the regions sizes,
for the region ending up as periphery, generally the price-index for manufactur-
ing goods decreases, since the positive import-price effect prevails on the negative
price-index effect. For the region ending up as the core, the price-index is rather
high, since the distortionary effect of increased taxation (used to finance infras-
tructure) dominates. As trade costs approach zero, the price-index in the setting
with infrastructure spending approaches the value of the same index in the setting
without infrastructure spending. As trade costs increase, the former price-index
decreases, thereby displaying the beneficial effects of public investment.
Third, free riding is beneficial for the periphery − in other words, centrally fi-
nanced infrastructure investments promote economic development in the periph-
ery. Put differently, regional or structural policy measures such as the EU’s
structural funds programs helping peripheral regions to improve their infrastruc-
ture make sense, at least to a certain extent. We show that infrastructure being
financed by the central region only makes its equilibrium agglomeration path sus-
tainable over the whole range of (initial) trade costs. Furthermore, the periphery
can devote all its tax revenue to local demand support, thereby generating addi-
tional income and a positive home market effect (which actually ends up driving
the catch-up process). Again, note that there is no tax competition scenario in
our paper, and therefore the free riding scenario may not be interpreted in its
classical sense, but we rather suggest to look at this from a policy point of view.
However, our framework lacks interregional tax competition, and the strategic in-
teractions between core and periphery regarding infrastructure building. We feel
that in this direction, enriched by public finance considerations about different
types of taxation on different agents, some promising analysis can be carried out
in the future − in particular in the light of the recent and future enlargement-
process of the European Union.
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